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Abstract
Biological systems exhibit a wide range of contextual eects, and this often
makes it dicult to construct valid mathematical models of their behaviour.
In particular, mathematical paradigms built upon the successes of Newtonian
physics make assumptions about the nature of biological systems that are
unlikely to hold true. After discussing two of the key assumptions underlying
the Newtonian paradigm, we discuss two key aspects of the formalism that
extended it, Quantum Theory (QT). We draw attention to the similarities
between biological and quantum systems, motivating the development of a
similar formalism that can be applied to the modelling of biological processes.
Keywords: contextuality, non-separability, biological models
1. Contextuality in Biology and the Failing Newtonian Paradigm
Biological systems are inherently contextual. Genes, species, and even
ecosystems can all exhibit profoundly dierent responses to the same stimu-
lus if it occurs within a dierent context. Despite this extreme complexity, it
is often assumed that a basic Newtonian modelling paradigm will prove su-
cient when it comes to the mathematical description of these systems. Thus,
it is common to assume that those techniques successful in the modelling of
simple physical systems will prove adequate to the description of biological
ones. However, the very assumptions of separability that are built into this
paradigm make such a straightforward application problematic, and indeed
has led to claims that a profoundly new bio-mathematics will be required for
the description of biological systems (Simeonov, 2010).
However, the question of what form such a new bio-mathematics needs
to take is not an easy one to answer. Many of our mathematical frameworks
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are implicitly built upon the very same Newtonian paradigm, as they were
initially developed in an attempt to understand phenomena that arose in
the physical world. Thus, geometry arose from attempts to model the size,
shape and relative positions of objects; calculus was developed in order to
model motion; and even probability theory came from attempts to predict
the likelyhood of discrete, classical events. An immediate challenge just
to conceptualise the likely form of a truly novel mathematics arises, but
this \Newtonian bias" also suggests a way forwards; perhaps the historical
developments of physics can themselves provide an intuitive way in which
to conceptualise the form that a future bio-mathematics will take. Indeed,
Kitto (2008) argued that the move from Newtonian to a quantum paradigm
in physics arose with the recognition that a set of fundamental and quite
implicit assumptions were incorrect for a certain class of complex system.
It is the purpose of this paper to show that the same set of Newtonian
assumptions break down for biological processes. This will lead to the claim
that a bio-mathematics will require a sophisticated treatment of context,
right at its core. While this might at rst seem like a dicult objective
to achieve, the historical developments of physics themselves suggest a way
forwards. There is already a class of mathematics capable of modelling con-
textuality, Quantum Theory (QT), which arose to replace certain Newtonian
models as they were shown to be incapable of modelling the contextuality
of physical systems. Two aspects of this formalism will be introduced in
section 4, and their potential application to certain biological processes will
be discussed in section 5.
We begin with a brief consideration of contextual behaviour as it arises
in a range of biological systems and processes. This will lead to a general
understanding of this behaviour, which is all too frequently assumed to be
specic to the system under description. We will draw attention to the
manner in which contextuality underlies much of the complexity of biological
systems, which itself suggests that these eects can be coherently modelled
with a mathematical apparatus that can treat context in a non-naive manner.
2. Genes, species and tness
Biology is rife with complex contextual dependencies, and this serves to
complicate our attempts to mathematically formalise it. It is clear that bio-
logical systems display contextual behaviour, more so in obviously complex
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scenarios concerning behaviour, cognition and ecological interactions, but
also in relatively simple systems involving only limited numbers of genes.
For example, what is the unit of selection in biology? Context appears
to pervade all attempts to identify such a factor, and certainly aects the
specication of those units which have been put forward. Thus, one of the
earliest denitions of a gene, which borrowed heavily from the Newtonian
paradigm to specify that it was \the smallest segment of the gene-string that
can be shown to be consistently associated with the occurrence of a specic
genetic eect" (Stadler, 1954) has been demonstrated to be largely incorrect,
and today we nd the notion of a gene becoming increasingly complex.
A likely example of genetic contextuality is discussed by Dibbens et al.
(2008), who have found an X-linked mental retardation syndrome, named
Epilepsy and Mental Retardation Limited to Females (EFMR), that does
not follow the canonical X-linked recessive or partial dominance mode of in-
heritance. Instead this syndrome aects only carrier females who bear one
normal and one mutant copy of the PCDH19 gene; males who carry only
a single copy of the gene, normal or mutant, are unaected. Dibbens et al.
(2008) propose that while \hemizygous transmitting males will have a ho-
mogeneous population of PCDH19-negative cells, ... aected females are
likely to be mosaics comprising PCDH19-negative and PCDH19{wild type
cells. Such tissue mosaicism may scramble cell-cell communication, which
manifests clinically as EFMR." Here we see the contextual eect of inter-
action between discordant neural domains resulting in pathological neural
behaviour. Thus, it is impossible to consider one gene (normal or mutant) as
causing the resulting phenotype; both are necessary for the eect to occur,
with signals transmitted by one cell type being scrambled by the other, which
takes on the role of a contextual factor, not directly inuencing signaling, but
notheless aecting it.
A second interesting example arises in a recent nding regarding the im-
portance of epigenetic factors in primate evolution. Zeng et al. (2012) exam-
ined the distribution of gene methylation in chimpanzee and human brains,
nding that hundreds of genes exhibit signicantly lower levels of promoter
methylation in the human brain than in the chimpanzee brain. Such a nding
is highly signicant as it can start to explain why these two species, which
have highly similar genomes (the genomes show 96% sequence identity), ex-
hibit a number of key dierences at the phenotypic level. For example, the
two species have very obviously dierent cognitive abilities, and humans are
far more likely to develop both cancer and autism. DNA methylation sup-
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presses gene expression without changing a cell's genetic information, and
plays a role in controlling developmental gene expression. Thus, it inhibits
oncogenesis and suppresses the activity of viruses and mobile repetitive ele-
ments. Keeping genes o that should be o reduces the likelihood of having a
gene that drives cellular proliferation from starting an oncogenic cascade, and
similarly repressing gene expression by transposable elements and viruses re-
duces their capacity to proliferate. Thus, it appears that chimpanzees have
more stable (or less dynamic) genomes due to their higher level of DNA
methylation. However, while this leaves them less prone to disorders such as
cancer and autism, it also makes them less uid in their neural development,
diminishing the development of their cognitive abilities. That DNA methy-
lation may be implicated in explaining the dierences between human and
chimpanzee cognitive abilities suggests that a simple change in phenotypic
context leads to the general suppression of gene activity, and so alters the
qualitative behaviour of the resulting system (Zeng et al., 2012).
Thus, these two examples serve to illustrate the complexity, and in partic-
ular the contextuality, that can be exhibited, even at the genetic level which
was originally proposed as fundamental. Such behaviour forces us to signi-
cantly expand our notion of a gene. Indeed, Jorgensen (2010) points out that
while the term `gene' is still frequently taken as referring to protein coding
sequences, a more modern understanding suggests that genes are comprised
of many interdependent elements, and that this makes it very dicult to
delimit even the boundaries of a gene. In a more recent work he refers to
a gene as a \eld of possibilities" (Jorgensen, 2011), taking his inspiration
from the quantum paradigm, which arose when a concerted eort to create
a Newtonian model of the particle met a similar set of problems.
Modern day Epigenetics has most certainly opened up the notion of in-
heritance as dependent upon far more than a set of particulate genes (as
the second example discussed above illustrated). It has shown how heritable
changes in gene expression can arise due to mechanisms other than changes
in a DNA sequence, and so further added to the complexity of early biolog-
ical systems. Indeed, at the end of this spectrum of increasing complexity,
the Hologenome Hypothesis rst described in detail by Jeerson (1994) sug-
gests that the holobiont (an animal or plant with all of its associated micro-
organisms) should be considered as a unit of selection in evolution (Zilber-
Rosenberg and Rosenberg, 2008; Rosenberg et al., 2009). According to the
hologenome theory of evolution, genetic variation can arise from changes in
either the host or the symbiotic microbiota genomes, and the tness of an
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organism might change quite profoundly, even in the same environment, if it
develops a dierent microbiota.
Even when classically conceived, it is not clear where the boundary be-
tween selective units and their environments lie; a gene is subject to its
environment, but this includes not only its cellular and extracellular envi-
ronment, but other genes and regulatory elements that it shares a nucleus
with, including in the case of diploid organisms, its homologue. Increasingly
in molecular biological research, the notion of functional units is expanding
to include network modules, rather than just genes (Barabasi and Oltvar,
2004). In a biological sense, the functional unit should be considered as the
unit of selection, but the complexities raised above show that this move does
not help as much as might have been expected.
Indeed, even if a single unit of selection can be dened, we must still
acknowledge further environmental complexities. Thus, organisms with the
same genotype may, if placed in a dierent environment, reveal signicantly
dierent phenotypes, to the extent that they may even be identied as dier-
ent species. Such phenotypic plasticity may be realised as alternative mor-
phologies, physiological states, and even behaviour, in response to diering
environmental conditions (West-Eberhard, 1989). Evolutionarily important
characters do not have to be `genetic' (immune to environmental eects)
reinforcing an often cited (but perhaps not truly recognised) fact that the
phenotype is a product of interaction between the genotype and the environ-
ment. Phenotypic plasticity forces us to accept that the phenotype depends
in a very strong way upon the environment that surrounds an organism;
a dierent environment can result in a vastly dierent organism. As West-
Eberhard (1989) states: \There is no one-to-one relation between phenotypes
and genes, yet a gene mutation is often visualized as the originator of a new
phenotypic trait", a mistake that invariably results in the attribution of a
diminished importance to the context in which an organism develops. Fur-
thermore, selection generally operates at the level of an organism, and so the
importance of development cannot be ignored.
Even tness is not a characteristic that can be ascribed simply to an
organism. It is well accepted that tness landscapes can change quite dra-
matically depending upon the environment in which an organism is found
(Brandon, 1990; Maynard Smith, 1993). For example, while it is benecial
that a person's skin colour be darker in colour in regions of high UV exposure,
and consequent risk of melanoma, it may be less benecial to have the same
skin tone in less sun-exposed regions where skin pigmentation reduces the
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eciency of vitamin D production (which is light-dependent). Also, tness
is not just aected by abiotic factors; the tness of a species of bird that
lays its eggs in a cli can be quite profoundly changed if there is a species of
lizard in the same vicinity that is capable of climbing to the nest.
Thus, even after this brief discussion we see that the basic units of a bio-
logical system can be very dicult to dene, with the context in which those
units are dened frequently being just as important to the characteristics
of the system as the units themselves (Canny, 1981). A bio-mathematics
must be able to treat such contextual eects in a sophisticated manner, but
as the bulk of our mathematical techniques are derived from an attempt to
model physical reality, we are frequently limited within an implicit Newto-
nian paradigm. This presupposes a set of characteristics that seem unlikely
to be apparent in the biological realm (and indeed many other realms where
complex behaviour is the norm rather than an exception (Kitto, 2008)). We
shall now attempt to dene two key Newtonian assumptions, drawing at-
tention to their origins, as well as to their inaccuracy for the case of many
biological systems.
3. The Failing Newtonian Paradigm
The discussion above leaves us with the recognition that biological sys-
tems are more complex than those of physics, at least in its initial formulation
of the Newtonian paradigm. However, this obvious point has not suppressed
the creation of a wide range of highly Newtonian models. For example, clas-
sical genetics and biochemistry are the epitome of Newtonian thinking, con-
sidering their fundamental units (genes and proteins) as functionally atomic
entities. Similarly, the more modern molecular approaches (i.e. molecular
genetics and molecular biology), which are essentially the children of these
two older approaches, still understand genes and protein complexes as dis-
crete objects undergoing well specied interactions which can be understood
with reference only to the relevant genetic factors. While it must be admit-
ted that a certain amount of success has been achieved with these overly
simplistic approaches, we might ask ourselves at what cost. Kitto (2008)
suggests that our standard reductive approach to mathematical modelling,
which is inherited from the Newtonian paradigm, appears to fail when it is
applied to systems exhibiting high end complexity, due to two closely related
barriers, one of objects, and the other of objectivity. These serve to trap our
thinking about systems and their modelling, and a genuine bio-mathematics
6
will require a move beyond both of the naive assumptions that underlie them.
In this section we shall consider each of these assumptions at some length,
calling attention to both their origins in the original formulation of the New-
tonian paradigm, as well as to the manner in which they quickly break down
for many biological systems.
3.1. Objects
As a species, we have evolved to recognise objects, and to classify the
world according to their behaviour. Furthermore, we have a predilection
across many dierent cultures and language groups to recognise the same
objects as fundamental, and this is reected in vocabularies that are largely
translatable (Phelps and Duman, 2012). This tendency continues in our
mathematical structures, with sets frequently forming the basis of our math-
ematical approaches to modelling per se (French and Krause, 1999), and
when it came to modelling physical reality, this tendency resulted in the
attribution of an elevated status to objects. Indeed, as discussed in the com-
prehensive account by Pullman (1998), the use of the object construct can
be traced back to at least as early as the fth century BC, when Democritus
and Leucippus designated \atoms" as the indivisible basic elements of mat-
ter, almost as the rst step in our development of a modern theory of matter.
This particulate assumption has tended to form the basis of more modern ap-
proaches, right up until the dawn of the quantum age. Thus, Dalton proposed
an atomic model to explain the chemical behaviour of materials, which was
rened as our physical understanding of atomic structure matured through
to a planetry model, proposed by Rutherford, where the atom was considered
as in turn made up of smaller objects (electrons, protons and neutrons). It
is interesting to note that at each point through this general development
process, at least up until the advent of quantum mechanics, the behaviour
of matter was explained in terms of more primitive objects, and at no point
was a fundamentally dierent model accepted into the mainstream model of
matter.1
This physical model profoundly aected the construction of biological
models. Indeed, as we saw above in section 2, the earliest models of the
1Some notable exceptions to this basic object driven mentality include both the wave
model of matter (Pullman, 1998), and Leibniz' monadic theory (Leibniz, 1992). Note
however, that in each case description was still reduced to a set of primitive elements;
waves in the rst case, and relations in the second.
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gene were very much derived from the same ontological viewpoint, with genes
being taken as indivisible and smallest progenitors of some phenotypic eect.
It is no accident that a well respected physicist (Schrodinger, 1965), provided
a very early account of the kind of structure (eventually discovered as DNA)
that would be required to explain the accruing biological inheritance eects
that experiments were nding.
However, even at the time that Schrodinger (1965) proposed an early
model of DNA (his book was originally published in 1944), he was simul-
taneously working upon the new Quantum Theory (QT). This model saw a
shift away from objects as fundamental, posing fundamental constraints upon
our ability to completely describe a system, which in turn suggests that the
concept of an object with a predened set of properties is inadequate, even
at the level of physics. This model was even further developed with the move
to Quantum Field Theory (QFT), where the notion of a vacuum was con-
siderably extended, and now forms a considerable part of the very denition
of a particle (Auyang, 1995). In this setting, the fundamental particle arises
from a constant and seething interaction with a vacuum that is itself made
up of a similar set of \virtual particles" which have a very similar status
to the original particles. The notion of a fundamental object becomes very
dicult to dene in this setting.
Thus, even in physics, we see that the basic Newtonian hypothesis that
reality has smallest building blocks relevant to the description of higher or-
der phenomena is no longer considered correct, and yet a very similar set
of assumptions appear to have pervaded the early biological discussions of
genetics. While much of modern biology suggests that an object driven on-
tology is incorrect, the eld is riddled with references to objects; just as
physicists still refer to particles in a very classical sense, which could be seen
to result in many of the \paradoxes" of modern physics, biology is also rife
with implicit references to genes, that few practicing biologists would actually
support if pressed. And yet the assumption is a hard one to break.
However, there are many reasons to suppose that a set oriented approach
to the modelling of all systems is inappropriate (Davies, 1984; Rohrlich, 1999;
Auyang, 1995). While more recent frameworks such as Category Theory
attempt to bypass this heavy dependency upon objects described by sets,
they do this at the expense of attributing a very similar status to relations;
we are heavily biased towards describing the world in terms of objects and
their interactions.
This natural predilection is perhaps not the most appropriate when it
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comes to the description of complex biological systems. For example, as we
saw above, the very notion of a gene is becoming increasingly dicult to pin
down to a specic object that undergoes a set of well dened interactions.
Indeed, the transformation of our understanding of a gene, from the physi-
cally inspired classical particle, to the far more complex \eld of possibilities"
described by Jorgensen (2011) is highly reminiscent of the very similar trans-
formation that occurred with the physical understanding of a particle, as it
transformed from a classical smallest unit of matter, to a quantum wave,
and nally to the highly complex quantum eld that is undergoing a con-
stant interaction with the vacuum. This very fact suggests a way forwards, as
physics evolved a sophisticated toolkit to model this extended understanding
of the particle, all based upon the formalism of quantum theory. Indeed, the
context-driven actualization of potential (CAP) model suggested by Gabora
and Aerts (2005, 2008), discusses the diculty of nding natural units of se-
lection in biology, and proposes a quantum inspired model will be necessary
for the description of the early appearance of life.
Additionally, it is important to recognise the openness of biological sys-
tems, which is in great contrast with the standard approximations of New-
tonian physics. Living systems must engage in a constant interaction with
their environment, drawing in nutrients and excreting waste products in a far
from equilibrium setting (Prigogine, 1996) just to maintain their integrity as
living objects. Thus, living objects seem to belong to a profoundly dierent
category of object from those that arise in the early physical models, which
are by construction considered to be closed and are frequently only discussed
in an equilibrium scenario. Even when an interaction is dened between
a physical system and its surrounding environment (as is the case in, for
example, the grand cannonical ensemble of statistical mechanics), this inter-
action is tightly controlled, allowing for little of the emergent novelty that
arises in many natural systems (Kitto, 2006). The objects of the Newtonian
paradigm are indivisible and fundamental, and biological systems do not in-
tuitively appear to fall into this category. This fundamental problem relates
to a closely related second core assumption of the Newtonian paradigm, that
of objectivity.
3.2. Objectivity
The assumption that the subject of our experiments passively yields infor-
mation about its state is an old one, and of profound importance to science.
We assume that our systems possess a certain level of objectivity; there is
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a reality `out there' which our experiments reveal, but is this assumption
correct?
It is common to assume that systems can be consistently described through
a reductive approach that separates them, into those components in which we
are interested, and those that are extraneous. However, as our understand-
ing of natural systems progresses we are nding more and more examples
where this is not necessarily the case. Many systems that we seek to un-
derstand cannot be cleanly separated from their surroundings, and this is
frequently due to a dependence on context. Relevant contexts might include
the experimental arrangement itself, factors external to the apparatus (e.g.
the environment surrounding the system and experimental apparatus), the
history of other experiments performed upon the system, etc.. Such con-
textuality is often perceived as negative, leading to the loss of realism, but
this is a far stronger claim than is justied. Admittedly, there is a very real
problem when it comes to analysing such systems; if a contextual system
is examined under two dierent contexts then a very dierent set of results
may be obtained. This implies that experiments and observations are not
merely discovering reality. There is a very real sense in which they might be
interacting with that reality, and we must be very careful to track the impact
of experimental design in such scenarios.
For example, it is reasonable to assume that a football has a well dened
separation from its surroundings, occurring at the boundary of the ball itself.
This assumption allows us to measure the position of the ball without directly
interfering with it (indeed the notion of scoring a goal is based upon this
very principle). We can also measure the position of the ball via a direct
interaction, when for example we kick it, but this interaction does not change
the position of the ball before the kick itself occurs, only after the interaction
takes place is the ball's dynamics aected. The ball can be assumed to satisfy
a basic principle of objectivity; our measurements merely reveal information
about its current state. As physics progressed, this assumption was adopted
at its core, and yet many systems do not behave in such a well dened manner.
Thus, although the particle analogy is very much adopted from the classical
picture of the ball described above, modern physics tells us that particles do
not exhibit an equivalent objectivity. Indeed, properties such as particle spin
yield contradictory results if they are assumed to be properties that exist `out
there' independent of the process of measurement, as for example, repeating
a Stern-Gerlach experiment will not always result in spin measurements that
are compatible with previous outcomes (Sakurai, 1985). Such behaviour
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belies the ction that our measurements simply reveal information about a
system; some systems can only be considered with a proper reference to their
context.
Similarly, biological systems tend towards an active interaction with mea-
surements and interactions. Indeed, the discussion of section 2 drew attention
to a number of scenarios where the context in which an interaction was oc-
curring resulted in a very dierent phenotype. Such behaviour violates the
assumption of objectivity, as the basic units of explanation (e.g. the genes)
will engage in dierent behaviour depending upon the context in which they
are found. Thus, the notion of objectivity is a very hard one to take as
fundamental within the modelling of biological processes.
Returning to the conception of openness introduced above, we can im-
mediately recognise that an open system will exhibit a contextual depen-
dence upon its environment; a changed environment can quite easily lead
to dierent phenotypes, adjusted tness characteristics, and other emergent
phenomena, all of which suggest that reality is not something `out there'
to be measured, but is rather created `on the y', within a given context.
While openness can result in contextual behaviour, it is important to recog-
nise that contextuality is a more general concept. Thus, phenomena such as
EFMR cannot be attributed to openness, although they can be attributed
to contextuality.
3.3. A New Paradigm?
Having considered two underlying assumptions of the Newtonian paradigm,
we start to see a way forwards. Physics itself has developed a new set of mod-
els to describe the behaviour of systems that did not satisfy such assumptions,
and the quantum formalism was born as a result. We shall now start to de-
velop the hypothesis that the quantum formalism can form the basis of a new
class of contextual mathematics that will assist with the development of both
a future bio-mathematics and more generally, of contextuality as it occurs in
a wide class of complex systems. The promise of a quantum inspired formal-
ism arises from its (admittedly often implicit) recognition that the Newtonian
paradigm, as is exemplied by the assumptions of objects behaving objec-
tively, cannot adequately describe the behaviour of all phenomena that we
might choose to model. We do not claim that an exact naive application of
quantum mechanics to the problem of modelling biological phenomena will
prove sucient. Rather, we propose that the quantum formalism oers a
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number of highly promising formal avenues and techniques, some of which
we shall now introduce in section 4.
4. Contextual Mathematics
In this section we shall consider two key concepts as they arise in the
quantum formalism, and show that there is every reason to suppose they
can be adapted as a rst step in the creation of a non-Newtonian biological
mathematics. We start with a set of probabilistic tests that can be used to
determine if a Newtonian approach to the modelling of a system is appropri-
ate.
4.1. Tests for contextuality
A simple toy example will serve to illustrate the much about the assump-
tions of objects and objectivity, and how a mathematical model of contextu-
ality diers from a simple Newtonian model.
b’
b
1+
1_
⇒{
1+
1_
⇒{a
a’
1+
1_ }⇐
1+
BA
}⇐1_
Figure 1: A potentially compositional system S, consisting of two assumed sub-components
A and B. S can perhaps be understood in terms of a mutually exclusive choice of exper-
iments upon those sub-components. Two alternative experimental settings probe either
proposed sub-component, represented by a or a0 for sub-component A, and b; b0 for sub-
component B. Each of these experiments can return a value, which we shall denote as +1
or  1 for generality, but could be considered as `yes' or `no' responses to the questions
represented by a; a0; b; b0.
Figure 1 depicts a hypothetical system S, in an environment E, which
we might seek to understand through the very standard trick of separating
S into two proposed components (or objects), A and B, that inuence each
other only via direct interaction. There are many questions that can be
asked about the validity of performing such a separation: can A and B
truly be regarded as separate or do they somehow indirectly inuence one
another?; Would a consideration of the combined system ABE give the
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same specication of behaviour as S E? What components of this system
exhibit causal interdependencies? Rather than resorting to philosophical
discussions however, many of these questions can be answered through the
use of probabilistic techniques, and a number of quite counter-intuitive results
have emerged when systems displaying contextual interdependencies have
been examined.
For example, while it is generally assumed that a system is by denition
separable in a well dened manner from its environment, whether a similar
separation can be performed between A and B is not a question that can be
so easily answered, even when there is no causal connection between the two
components. Breaking the system down further, many dierent elds assume
scenarios of experimental separability. For example, suppose that two dier-
ent experiments can be carried out upon each of the presumed subsystems,
which will answer a set of `questions' with binary outcomes. We shall repre-
sent these questions using four possible measurement settings, consisting of
two alternative questions asked of either sub-component. Thus, a choice of
two experimental settings a or a0 can be applied to sub-component A, and
similarly b or b0 can be applied to sub-component B. Each of these exper-
imental questions lead to a binary outcome (traditionally in QT a detector
clicks or it does not) which represents either a `yes' or a `no' answer to the
question asked of the system. For the sake of generality we shall denote these
responses as +1 or  1 respectively, they form a set of random variables that
we shall label as A;A0;B, and B0. It is now possible to consider the notion
of the probability distribution over these outcomes; what characteristics will
be possessed by the random variables describing this system?
As with many systems, the outcomes of our experiments will have a sta-
tistical distribution over all available outcomes, and this can be used to deter-
mine whether the sub-components can be considered as isolated, inuencing
one another, or in some sense irreducible. Frequently, joint probability distri-
butions such as Pr(A;A0;B;B0) are used to model the behaviour of systems
like that represented in gure 1, however, it has been shown that this joint
probability does not exist for certain quantum (Fine, 1982) and psychologi-
cal systems (Dzhafarov and Kujala, 2012; Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012; Bruza
et al., 2012), which raises the possibility that a similar result might be found
in contextually dependent biological systems. When such behaviour is evi-
dent, we have clear reason to suppose that the system under examination is
contextual; experiments performed upon sub-system B aect the results of
experiments performed upon sub-system A, even though the two sub-systems
13
were presumed independent. Thus, the context of sub-system A, as repre-
sented by sub-system B, can have a well dened non-causal inuence upon
its behaviour.
More generally, an entire class of tests have been developed which can
be used to determine the validity of the assumption that a system is non-
contextual. Results such as Bell's theorem, the Clauser{Horne{Shimony{
Holt theorem, Greenberger{Horne{Zeilinger and Hardy's results, as well as
the Kochen{Specker theorem2, all generate strong restrictions on the possible
form that a separable system can have, and their violation frequently entails
contextual behaviour.
Many of these tests are based upon a variation of the triangle inequality,
which allows for the simultaneous comparison of a set of expectation values
describing the outcomes of experiments performed upon systems such as
that depicted in gure 1. We shall use an even simpler proof, which depends
instead upon recognising that the random variables contribute to average
values (represented by here by j : : :j) which must be less than or equal to 1:
j Aj  1; j A0j  1; j Bj  1; j B0j  1: (1)
We can then derive a restriction on the probability distribution that must
be satised by a separable system, which in this case is dened as a system
for which experiments performed at A will not aect those performed at B
and vice versa. More specically, the result of running experiments a or a0
do not depend upon the experimental settings at B (i.e. b or b0), and a 1
result at B does not depend upon the experimental settings at A (i.e. a or
a0).
Now, it is possible to construct a joint probability, describing the distribu-
tion of outcomes in the two experimental regions, and how it might depend
upon a set of hidden parameters, or latent variables, denoted , which is
assumed to have a normalised probability distribution  :
R
d() = 1. The
joint probability for experimental arrangement a; b becomes
P (a; b) =
Z
d()A(a; )B(b; ) (2)
2The interested reader could consult any of Bell (1987); Laloe (2001); Greenberger et al.
(1990); Shimony (1984); Mermin (1993) for a broad introduction to many of these results
as they arise in quantum physics.
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and a similar set of relationships can be constructed for all experimental
arrangements. Thus, for example, it becomes possible to make claims about
how the probability distributions for dierent experimental arrangements
should be related:
P (a; b)  P (a; b0) (3)
=
Z
d()A(a; )B(b; ) 
Z
d()A(a; )B0(b0; ) (4)
=
Z
d() [A(a; )B(b; )] (1A0(a0; )B0(b0; ))]
 
Z
d() [A(a; )B0(b0; ) (1A0(a0; )B(b; ))] : (5)
Then, making use of assumption (1), we can construct an inequality
jP (a; b)  P (a; b0)j 
Z
d() (1A0(a0; )B0(b0; ))
+
Z
d() (1A0(a0; )B(b; )) (6)
= 2 (P (a0; b0) + P (a0; b)) ; (7)
and a little rearrangement results an inequality that has become somewhat
notorious in the eld of quantum physics:
jP (a; b)  P (a; b0)j+ jP (a0; b0) + P (a0; b)j  2: (8)
This is the Clauser{Horne{Shimony{Holt (CHSH) inequality (Clauser et al.,
1969), and it must be satised by any probabilistic system that satises the
basic conditions introduced to obtain it. Thus, it is a very general statement
about the possibility of separating a system into objective components which
interact only via the proposed variable . If this inequality is violated, then
this separation is impossible, and the Newtonian paradigm does not apply.
It is worth emphasising the generality of this result. While it was origi-
nally obtained in the eld of quantum theory, the derivation repeated here
for the scenario represented in gure 1 makes no assumptions as to the na-
ture of the system that is modelled by the probabilistic framework that it
proposes, merely as to its potential separability. Biological systems (such
as those discussed in section 1) are highly likely to exhibit similar forms of
non-separability due to their inherently contextual nature, and tests such as
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the CHSH inequality can provide a clear dividing line between those systems
that can be described by a Newtonian approach, and those that should not
be.
In section 5 we shall make use of a more specic modication of the CHSH
inequality that has been proposed in a recent work by Bruza et al. (2012).3
This test takes the framework discussed above, and rather than considering
a proposed latent variable, directly models the manner in which two random
variables can contextually inuence one another. Thus, adding the joint
probabilities p1; p2; :::p16 to the model, we can consider their interdependent
eects in a very concise matrix form:
A
A
+1
 1
A0
+1
 1
B
B
+1  1
B0
+1  10BBBB@
p1 p2
p3 p4
p5 p6
p7 p8
p9 p10
p11 p12
p13 p14
p15 p16
1CCCCA = PAB (9)
where, for example, p1 = P (A = +1;B = +1), and p14 = P (A
0 = +1;B0 =
 1). This matrix exhibits some highly interesting structural properties that
arise from a violation of equations like (8). In particular, when
 = j2(p1 + p4 + p5 + p8 + p9 + p12 + p14 + p15   2)j > 2 (10)
then a similar CHSH style non-separability result has been obtained.4
The quite curious form of (10) calls for some explanation. With refer-
ence to PAB in (9) we can see that (10) results from summing the diagonal
probabilities of the rst three quadrants, but with the fourth quadrant of (9)
contributing via its reverse diagonal (p14+ p15). As each quadrant in (9) is a
joint probability distribution, it must sum to one, and so we nd  taking its
theoretically maximal value j2(4 2)j = 4, when all of its probability mass is
3Based upon work originally performed by Cereceda (2000) for the case of quantum
systems.
4Note that a set of these equations can be obtained through permutation of the asso-
ciated variables.
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centred on the appropriate diagonals.5 This allows us to understand how a
general violation of the inequality in (10) can take place. Probabilities on the
diagonals correspond to cases where a set of responses to a given experimen-
tal context is either purely correlating, or anti-correlating with that context.
A little algebra shows that if the senses are perfectly correlated in all four
experimental contexts, (i.e., if p1 + p4 = 1; p5 + p8 = 1; p9 + p12 = 1, and
p13+p16 = 1) then (10) has the value 2. Maximal correlation is not sucient
for a violation of (10), which requires sucient anti-correlated probability
mass on a reverse diagonal (i.e. p14 + p15). Thus, a positive non-separability
result in this framework requires a complex set of interdependent responses
to a set of contexts.
In section 5 we shall consider a number of scenarios where this analytical
framework might be applied to the analysis of biological systems, but for now
we shall introduce a second aspect of the quantum formalism.
4.2. Emergence and Novelty
The very potentiality of the quantum formalism makes it a prime can-
didate for modelling the emergence of new structures and objects. Indeed,
a number of dierent researchers have drawn attention to useful features of
the quantum formalism in the description of behaviour frequently identied
as biological, including Primas (1983) who noted that it is possible to per-
form a perturbation expansion over multiple time scales, Frohlich (1988) who
proposed that coherent phase correlations will play \a decisive role in the de-
scription of biological materials and their activity", and Davydov (1991) who
considers a biological soliton that is resistant to thermal uctuations (see also
Aerts et al. (2006) for a more recent treatment). These specic proposals all
rely upon a shift to Quantum Field Theory (QFT), which entails an added
mathematical complexity, but allows for more than one stable ground (i.e.
lowest energy) state (Umezawa, 1993; Vitiello, 2001) in a mechanism that
makes use of the notion of spontaneous symmetry breaking. In short, if a
system falls into a situation where its ground state does not have the same
continuous symmetry as its dynamics (as represented by its Lagrangian) then
it is considered to be exhibiting spontaneous symmetry breaking. Goldstone's
theorem then implies that a number of massless bosons will be generated,
the number which will equal the number of broken symmetries in the system
5That is, p1; p4; p5; p8; p9; p12; p14; p15.
17
(Marshak, 1993). These bosons are termed Nambu{Goldstone modes (NG-
modes), and due to their massless nature they are long-range, and can move
through an entire system without losing energy which provides long range
coherence between dierent extended parts of that system (Vitiello, 2001).
Because of their boson status many NG-modes may occupy the same ground
state without changing the energy of the system, which means that it can
be found in many structurally dierent ground states. This means that the
system can be found in a number of lowest energy congurations, all of which
are stable. It can evolve between these states and so change its conguration,
without the input of energy that would be required if only one ground state
was available.
Biologically, the innovation provided by a mathematical description of
multiple ground states is essential. Stability is ubiquitous and common in
biological systems, rather than a special case. A mathematical approach
to the description of such systems, which allows for multiple lowest energy
states, bypasses the need to explain how biological systems can maintain
their stability while obviously changing their current state. The dierent
congurations of these modes represent alternative stable arrangements of
the system, i.e. each is physically dierent and yet stable. This scenario is not
possible in a classical or even a standard quantum system; there is only one
lowest energy state in these theories. QFT is the only quantum formalism (of
which we are currently aware) that is capable of generating emergent novelty
in a system, rather than the more standard modelling of a set of pre-existing
components and their interactions (Umezawa, 1993; Vitiello, 2001; Kitto,
2006). This is to be expected since its basis could be argued to lie in the
necessity of modelling the creation and annihilation of particles in modern
high energy experiments; QFT was invented to model the emergence of new
particles.
In what follows, we shall describe the specic mathematical mechanism
underlying this eect, which we shall term NG-emergence, after its key de-
velopers in physics (Nambu (1960b,a) and Goldstone (1961)). First proposed
in a model for superconductivity (Nambu, 1960b), NG-emergence is a mech-
anism essential to the modern formulation of particle physics (Weinberg,
1996). It is also widely utilised in modern formulations of condensed matter
physics (Umezawa, 1993; Altland and Simons, 2010). Less standard uses have
also arisen, in models of memory (Vitiello, 2001), scal dynamics (Sornette,
2003) and sympatric speciation (Kitto, 2008). This raises the possibility that
a generalisation of the mechanism beyond physical systems might be possi-
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ble, and this section will briey discuss the manner in which this mechanism
arises with the aim to facilitate its generalisation. We caution the reader
that it would be a mistake to assume that this discussion is sucient as a
full introduction to the topic, it should merely be taken as a non-technical
introduction to a eld that can be very dicult to approach. The inter-
ested reader is encouraged to consult any of (Weinberg, 1996; Peskin and
Schroeder, 1995) for a more thorough treatment of these concepts as they
arise in particle physics, or (Altland and Simons, 2010; Umezawa, 1993) for
an introduction more oriented towards condensed matter physics. An excel-
lent general review of Goldstone bosons in nuclear, particle and condensed
matter physics is provided by Burgess (2000), and an overview of concep-
tual foundations and issues in the eld is provided by either Cao (1999) or
Marshak (1993).
The rst step in making the switch to a QFT requires the introduction of a
eld, which is an eect generally distributed over a spatial extent (rather than
the more traditional localised particle, which is very much in keeping with the
Newtonian paradigm). When describing the dynamics of a system of elds
(t), physics tends to make use of the action S[], which is a time integral
over the dierence between the kinetic (T ), and potential (U) energies of
that system at a point in time t:
S =
Z t2
t1
(T (t)  U(t)) dt: (11)
This is the time integral of the Lagrangian L[(t)], which can in turn be
described by taking the spatial integral of the Lagrangian density L:
S[(x)] =
Z
L[]dt =
Z
dt
Z
dx L[; @x; @t]: (12)
Thus, the action describes the spatiotemporal conguration of a system and
its relationship to its energy. Physical systems satisfy the Principle of Least
Action (Feynman et al., 2005): S[x] = 0, meaning that any physical system
will have a dynamics that minimises its action and so gives it a tendency
towards manifesting in a conguration that is energetically least costly. This
result in turn implies the Euler{Lagrange equations of motion, i.e. the dy-
namics of the system must take the following form:
@

@L
@(@)

  @L
@
= 0; (13)
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where @ indicates a dierentiation with respect to either time or the relevant
space upon which the eld is dened and  might refer to a system of elds
i. Equation (13) corresponds to a system of equations that must be satised
by any physical system.
Such systems often exhibit symmetries, which are simply congurations
of some property of the system which remain invariant under some sort of
transformation (e.g. a translation, reection, or a rotation of the system). We
shall consider only continuous symmetries here, as these are the ones that are
important for the concept of NG-emergence. Mathematically, a continuous
symmetry can be approached by considering our eld (x) to be varying over
some space x that will for our purposes remain unspecied. We can discover
much about this eld by considering an innitesimal transformation of it:
(x)! 0(x) = (x) +
X
a
!aa(); (14)
where the !a are a collection of independent symmetry parameters and a()
are the relevant deformations of the eld. We take the opportunity here to
discuss some notational simplications commonly utilised in physics. Firstly,
note that the eld  represented in (14) makes no reference to dependencies
upon time, multi-dimensional space, etc. and appears to be relatively simple.
However, (14) can in fact represent the transformation of a high dimensional
eld: (x) = (t; x1; x2; : : : ), and should be treated carefully. For the sake
of simplicity, what follows will utilise the simplied notation (x). Secondly,
the summation symbol in (14) is generally dropped in the physics literature,
with the double index xaya 
P
a x
aya used to denote summation.
The transformation (14) is called a symmetry if it leaves the equations
of motion invariant, which is in itself ensured if the action is unchanged, or
that the Lagrangian density must be invariant up to a 4-divergence (Peskin
and Schroeder, 1995; Burgess, 2000).
L  @(!aV a ); (15)
for some quantities V a (). This requirement is related to Noether's theorem,
which states that for every transformation that leaves the equations of mo-
tion (13) invariant (i.e. for every symmetry), there is a conserved physical
quantity, often termed a charge Q, which has the form
Q =
Z
space
j0dx; (16)
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where the current6, j can be dened
ja   
@L
@(@)
a + V

a (17)
such that it satises the set of equations @j

a = 0 (i.e. it is conserved).
Looking at equation (13) we can intuitively explain this result. The second
term in this equation describes the change of the Lagrangian with a change
in the eld. A symmetry in the Lagrangian with respect to the eld (i.e.
@L=@ = 0) implies that the change in the rst quantity with respect to x
should be zero. This means that the rst quantity in (17) will be conserved
under dierentiation.
We now come to the main point. When a continuous symmetry of the
underlying theory (i.e. the dynamics represented by the Lagrangian) does
not match the symmetry of the ground state, j
i (i.e. there is a degeneracy of
the ground state, meaning that there are multiple lowest energy states) then
a massless Goldstone boson arises, NG, one for every independent broken
symmetry. The new emergent state, jNGi, is dened by the fact that the
matrix element specied by taking the inner product between it and the
charge applied to the ground state must be non zero:
hNGjj0(x)j
i 6= 0: (18)
Thus, (18) gives a relationship that must be satised by the new emergent
dynamics in the system, and so restricts the behaviour of the new objects
that arise within its mathematical description.
What causes a symmetry to break? A good overview is provided by
Castellani (2003), who discusses the manner in which physicists break sym-
metry both explicitly (through the specic addition of terms) and sponta-
neously (where solutions exist to the dynamical equations of a system which
break the symmetry of those equations). Both mechanisms could prove rel-
evant to the description of biological systems, but it is highly likely that
the symmetries of biology are going to be much more complex than those of
physics. A strong case for the a description of biological processes that made
use of NG-emergence would require the establishing of a relevant symme-
try group, and then nding a mechanism whereby it could be spontaneously
6While this nomenclature (charge and current) is originally derived from electrody-
namics, it can be extended to any other symmetry and conserved quantity in physics (e.g.
conservation of energy from invariance of physical laws under shifts in time).
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broken, perhaps through an environmental interaction. Thus, an underlying
mechanism that would creates a divergence between the symmetry of the
dynamics of the system and its solutions. We expect that this mechanism
will prove very important in biological modelling, although it has a less well
understood status in fundamental physics due to the lack of understanding
as to what can drive the dynamical inuence. However, a proof of principle
toy model was proposed by Kitto (2006, 2008), which presented a model of
sympatric speciation based upon this mechanism, and so there is reason to
hope that such a model can be applied in the eld of biology. In section 5.4
we shall propose a second possible application of this mechanism in the eld
of developmental biology.
5. Contextual Models of Biological Processes
This section will point to four examples from biology, drawing attention to
their specically contextual features, and the manner in which the formalism
introduced above can be brought to bear upon their analysis.
5.1. Non-separability of the G matrix?
Evolutionary biology frequently seeks to predict the future response of a
species to selection, and conversely, to estimate the selection pressure that
was responsible for the production of a phenotype that is currently under con-
sideration. Quantitative genetics has made signicant contributions to the
mathematical understanding these responses, in both natural and domes-
tic populations, and one mathematical approach focusses upon the G matrix
(Phillips and McGuigan, 2006; Ro, 2000), which provides a prime candidate
for the application of the formalism that was discussed in section 4.1.
The G matrix arises from an extension of the breeders' equation, which
models a proportional relationship between Response, R, heritability h and
the selection dierential S as R = h2S. Thus, with a stronger selection
pressure, or a more heritable trait, a bigger response can be generated in
a population that one is trying to shift in a desired direction. In its more
complex form, each of these terms are elevated to a multivariate form, thus,
the vector z is used to describe the mean response of a population to
selection, which changes with a dependency upon: a matrix of Phenotypic
variances and covariances P ; a vector of selection dierentials S; and G, the
matrix of genetic variances and covariances
z = GP 1S: (19)
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This relationship gives a system of interdependent, and potentially quite
complex equations. While it is common to consider only two traits, and so
to obtain a 22 G matrix, this formalism can be used to consider the eects
that arise when far more genes are covaried. However, even in its simplest
form, the tests for contextuality that were introduced in section 4.1 provide a
new way in which to analyse the behaviour of systems that can be formalised
in this setting.
Returning to the matrix PAB that was introduced in (9) and its relation-
ship to the G matrix in equation (19), we can consider the inuence that
two genes might have upon the eventual development of a phenotype. Mak-
ing use of the idea that a gene can be either `on' or `o', in response to a
set of contexts, we can almost directly map the formalism above into this
scenario. Thus, for two genes A and B, each being considered within two
dierent contextual scenarios a; a0 and b; b0, we denote a gene that switches
`on' with +1, and `o' with  1. This now allows for a consideration of the
non-separability of the response of the two genes that are considered within
a G matrix construct | can they be considered independently (in which
case   2 for a given set of data), or are their responses contextually non-
separable? Furthermore, if their responses are non-separable, how will this
aect the evolution of the phenotype as is represented in (19)?
We anticipate that (9) could be used to discover contextual interdepen-
dencies between genes for which no mechanism has yet been discovered. This
would allow for the identication of scenarios where new biological processes
are yet to be understood, and so would help to suggest fertile areas for future
biological work and empirical investigation.
Future work will seek data that can be analysed within this framework,
and search for scenarios where a genetic response must be designated as
contextually non-separable.
5.2. Ecosystem analysis
What are the fundamental units of an ecosystem? This question is fre-
quently answered too quickly, without reference to the context in which the
question is asked, which can lead to the assumption that an ecosystem is
equivalent to the species within it. However, the scale at which an ecosystem
is examined can profoundly aect even the designation of its basic units:
Depending on the spatiotemporal scale or window through which
one is viewing the world, a forest stand may appear (1) as a dy-
namic entity in its own right, (2) as a constant (i.e., nondynamic)
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background within which an organism operates, or (3) as incon-
sequential noise in major geomorphological processes. Thus, it
becomes impossible to designate the components of the ecosystem.
The designations will change as the spatiotemporal scale changes.
O'Neill et al. (1986, p83)
Thus, the notion of a fundamental object is rather dicult to maintain in
an ecosystem, as it is inherently aected by the level of analysis. A similar
problem arises within QFT, where even non-composite (i.e. fundamental)
particles (such as photons and muons) can decay into other particles, mak-
ing the notion of a fundamental unit very dicult to justify, and highly
contingent upon the level of analysis. Mathematical approaches such as the
Renormalisation Group can be used in QFT to investigate the changes that
arise in a system as it is viewed at dierent scales, and such an approach has
already been suggested in the eld of ecology (Milne, 1998). Furthermore,
the manner in which new species evolve in a particular ecosystem can be
modelled using a QFT framework, and Kitto (2008) introduces a simple toy
model of sympatric speciation that is built upon this very foundation.
An alternative approach which could be utilised in the modelling of
ecosystems was presented in section 4.1, where we proposed a class of tests
that could be used to determine whether the elements in a system could be
considered as separable or not. We anticipate that tests such as these can
be used to determine whether changing the interactions that one species in
a system undergoes can have an eect upon the interactions that another
is participating within. Thus, this class of tests could prove essential to
the anticipatory probabilistic modelling of ecosystem dynamics, and we are
currently searching for appropriate scenarios in which to apply them.
5.3. Non-monotonicity in equine repeat groups
Another potential scenario where the quantum formalism might be ap-
plied concerns the apparent contextuality that arises in the modern analysis
of repeat groups in the equine genome (Adelson et al., 2010). This study
concerned the evolution and function of parasitic genomic elements known
as retrotransposable elements (RTEs). RTEs are able to duplicate their se-
quence of nucleic acid bases into genomic sites that are distant from the
original element. As is the case with most biological systems, RTEs inter-
act both with their host, where there is a tension due to potential genomic
damage that they can cause, and with other similar elements in the host;
24
some classes of RTE are unable to autonomously replicate, but are able to
make use of the replication systems of other classes, making them essentially
parasitic on those autonomously capable classes. These interactions give rise
to a dynamic environmental landscape in which the elements evolve, similar
to the situation in macro-scale ecosystems. In their analysis of the horse
genomic repeat organisation, Adelson et al. (2010) examined the eect that
bin size (essentially the scale of locality) has upon the correlation analysis of
the repeat groups in the genome, and somewhat surprisingly found that 34%
of the pairs had a bin size dependent response of correlation to bin size. This
indicated that some associations appeared to be specic for certain scales, or
genomic distances. Such an eect is generally assumed not to exist in biolog-
ical systems; an increasing bin size should include more relevant information
and so lead to strengthened correlations, indeed, 61% of pairs did precisely
this. More intriguingly, almost 10% of pairs had correlations that changed
sign as a function of bin size. The assumption that strengthened correlations
will result from increasing bin size springs from a false assumption that the
groups under consideration can always be separated into components A and
B which exhibit a stable response irrespective of the amount of genetic mate-
rial that is considered within one bin. A dependence upon bin size indicates
that material considered extraneous to the subsystem A  B is not in fact
so.
This eect is a prime candidate for a contextual model of the form in-
troduced in sections 4.1, however, the development of this model will require
more data than is available in the considered paper, and will be left for future
work.
5.4. The development of an embryo
A nal potential domain in which to build a quantum inspired model
concerns the process of embryonic development. Here, it seems possible to
approximate an unfertilised egg as a sphere satisfying a SO(3) symmetry
group. This means that the egg can be rotated in any direction, by any
amount, and still look essentially the same. However, environmental cues
(such as sperm penetration, the point of attachment during implantation,
etc.) frequently act to break this symmetry. Thus, when fertilised, the point
at which sperm enters an egg acts to dynamically break this symmetry, and
the system can no longer be arbitrarily rotated. This then oers a situation
in which the mechanism of NG-emergence can conceivably be applied, with
the emergent modes then acting as the basis of the tissue dierentiation that
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starts to develop. Furthermore, if the inuence of the sperm upon the egg
is treated as a signal, then it is possible to develop a picture of a wave of
inuence that sweeps through the egg, further breaking the symmetry, and
potentially generating a further set of new NG modes. Future work will seek
to formalise this proposed model.
6. Conclusions
This paper has drawn attention to the highly contextual nature of biologi-
cal systems, at all levels of analysis. We have proposed that this contextuality
makes the Newtonian paradigm of modelling, which assumes set-like objects
that can be objectively probed in our experiments without interacting with
them, inappropriate as an underlying formalism. However, a way forward
beckons, and it can be approached through reference to Quantum Theory,
the formalism that extended the Newtonian paradigm in physics itself. We
have discussed two aspects of this formalism that seem particularly appro-
priate to the modelling of biological systems and processes, and discussed
some possible scenarios where they might be fruitfully applied.
Although we have made direct reference to the quantum formalism in
presenting this paper, we do not anticipate that a contextual mathematics
aimed at the modelling of biological processes would share all of its aspects
with the one that was developed to model the contextuality of physical pro-
cesses. Thus, while the formalism that we have introduced here owes many
of its characteristics to physics, it is likely that this formalism will become
far more complex as it is extended to biology. Indeed, we hold with the idea
advocated by Rosen (1991), that a formalism aimed at the modelling of bi-
ological processes will prove more general than that aimed at their physical
counterparts, and thus anticipate that the quantum inspired approaches that
we have introduced here will require signicant extension as they are applied
to biological modelling (Kitto et al., 2009). Meeting this challenge is likely to
expand upon our understanding of both elds, providing us with signicant
new insights about the modelling of a reality that is far more complex than
we ever imagined.
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